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2 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I: THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO RECOGNIZE THE 
DISTINCTION BETWEEN A "RESERVATION" AND AN 
"EXCEPTION" WHEN IT FOUND THE VALENCIAS CANNOT 
PRECLUDE THE BRADBURYS' USE OF THE LANE. 
The Bradburys, in their Argument, Point 1, claim "[t]he Deeds are indisputable 
evidence of the existence of the easement and its scope." At the same time, the 
Bradburys state that the "origin of the easement could not be determined by the court." In 
the same breath, the Bradburys claim that the reservation language was intended to be an 
"exception" under Hartman vs. Potter, 642 P.2d 710 (Utah 1979). However, the trial 
court based its decision on the premise that though the Bradburys have no right to enter 
the property, the Valencias do not possess the right to exclude them. The trial judge 
stated: 
[t]he court concludes that Summary Judgment should be granted in favor of 
Plaintiffs relative to their access and use of said right-of-way on the basis that 
Defendants are unable to preclude the same as they purchased the land subject to 
that reservation and their rights in the land continue subject to that reservation 
which cannot be unilaterally extinguished. [Emphasis added.] 
(R. 195, Appellees' Brief p. 8). The Bradburys now argue that the reason the Valencias 
cannot exclude them is because the Valencias' took possession of the land subject to an 
exception clause. In essence, the trial court construed the reservation of right-of-way as 
an "exception" clause which withheld conveyance of the right-of-way, in fee, from the 
Valencias. In so characterizing the Valencias' fee, the court relied, in part, upon the 
holding in Hartman v. Potter that a property owner cannot"... convey, except, or reserve 
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more than they owned . . . " and concluded that the Valencias are not seized of the right of 
way sufficient to exclude plaintiffs. Hartman v. Potter, 596 P.2d 653, 657 (Utah 1979). 
However, in Hartman, the Supreme Court explained the difference between a reservation 
and an exception: 
A technical distinction exist between a 'reservation' and an 'exception.' A 
reservation reserves to the grantor some New thing issuing out of the thing granted 
and not in esse before, and an exception Excludes from the operation of the grant 
some Existing portion of the estate granted which would otherwise pass under the 
general description of the deed. . . A reservation is the creation in behalf of a 
grantor of a new right, that is, an easement issuing out of the thing granted, 
something which did not exist as an independent right before the grant. An 
exception is a clause in a deed which withdraws from its operation some part of 
the thing granted which would otherwise have passed to the grant[ee] under the 
general description. 
Id. at 657-8. Therefore, the trial court erred when it characterized the description of the 
right-of-way as an exception rather than a reservation in order to find that the Valencias 
do not possess the right to exclude the Bradburys. 
In contradistinction to the trial court's reasoning, the Utah Supreme Court 
expressly decided in Chournos v. D'Agnillo, 642 P.2d 710, 712 (Utah 1982), that "the 
words 'right of way' are generally held to denote an easement or servitude rather than an 
interest in fee simple." Under the principle laid down by the Utah Supreme Court in 
Chournos, a right of way is not carved out of the fee but rather passes to the grantee, in 
fee, subject only to a grantors' reservation of an easement or servitude. The right-of-way 
at issue is not an exception as defined in Potter. According to Potter, it is a reservation. 
Moreover, Chournos expressly held that the language "right-of-way" denotes a reservation 
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— not an exception. Therefore, the trial court erred in its application of the law. Both 
Potter and Chournos require the conclusion that the Valencias are seized of the right of 
way in fee " . . . subject only to the claims of any persons owning a deeded right therein . . 
." Chournos at 712. Therefore, because the defendants own the fee subject only to 
persons owning a deeded right therein, and because plaintiffs admit to having no deeded 
right to use the lane, the trial court erred in not allowing defendants to exclude them from 
the property. 
POINT II: THE DOMINANT ESTATE NO LONGER ABUTS THE 
SERVIENT ESTATE AND THEREFORE ANY EASEMENT 
MUST BE EXTINGUISHED 
Grant Young devised the original Isaac Young estate into three parcels retaining 
property between the Valencias and the Bradburys. Where the original dominant estate 
no longer abuts the servient estate, the rule laid down in Wood vs. Ashby, 122 Utah 580, 
and restated in Alvey Corp. vs. Mackelprang, 2002 UT App 220, mandates that "an 
easement is extinguished when, after the division of the dominant tenement, a newly 
created parcel does not abut the servient tenement." Id. 
CONCLUSION 
Accordingly, the judgment of the first District Court should be reversed and 
summary judgment entered in favor of defendants. 
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